What
is tail risk and how does it relate to the stability of the correlation matrix?
How
does it interact with rebalancing?
Is
it possible to identify the benefit one gets from rebalancing based upon market
developments?
How
do oil price fluctuations and foreign exchange fluctuations relate to the
benefit of rebalancing?
What
are the implications for a US investor’s international holdings?
This posting advances the notion that instability in
the correlation matrix is indicative of a rise in the potential tail risk. Further, the potential for tail risk should
inform an investor’s approach to rebalancing his or her portfolio. The conclusions drawn in this posting may be
unique to market fluctuations caused by oil price and exchange rate
instability. The posting does not
attempt to look beyond potential consequences of oil price and exchange rate
instability. It concludes by looking at
the investment implications of the central thesis regarding the relationship
between the correlation matrix and potential tail risk. Not surprisingly, the conclusions regarding
the implications vary dependent upon one's home currency. This posting focuses specifically on the
implications for US investors.
In finance, “risk” is usually equated with
volatility. Sticking with that
definition, tail risk would be extreme volatility. It is important in financial markets because
of the phenomenon known as the fat tail: basically, the probability of an
extreme event is higher than what one would assume from a normal
distribution. According to that
definition, tail risk is just the same as “risk.” It is the probability that makes it significant.
A second definition of tail risk is a low
probability event that has huge consequences.
The second definition does not quantify low probability. Instead it focuses on the magnitude of the
consequences. However, it is silent on
whether those consequences are the volatility of the variable concerned or some
other event that is triggered as a result of the low probability event. Volatility of the variable is illustrated by
a tendency for the amount of change to go exponential when it approaches an
extreme. Triggering of some other event is
illustrated by, for example, an extreme change in the price of a commodity
forcing a government to default on its loans.
The final candidate as a definition of tail risk considers
a phenomenon in finance that is extremely important. It combines elements of the two previous
definitions. It is associated with, and
perhaps a consequence of, extreme volatility.
When there is extreme volatility, it is often accompanied by a breakdown
in the relationship between different financial assets. In financial jargon, the correlation matrix
breaks down.
Being statistical measures, how well things are
correlated are not a constant. They
fluctuate. Thus, while a breakdown in
the correlation matrix is often associated with tail risk as defined in the
first and second definition, it also sometimes occurs without the realization
of tail risk. A breakdown in the
correlation matrix can be viewed as a necessary-but-not-sufficient condition
for tail risk.
This last definition based upon the stability of the
correlation matrix has the advantage that it provides room for recognition of
the fat tail of the distribution of returns and it defines “the event with huge
consequences” in terms of financial market performance. More importantly, tail risk usually proceeds
quickly. By contrast, deterioration of
the correlation matrix can be seen before it completely breaks down. Thus, one can view the deterioration in the
correlation matrix as a continuous variable that will change going into a tail
risk event as defined in the first two definitions.
The previous posting, “Markets in Motion,” talked
about the market volatility in oil prices and foreign exchange rates. Both phenomena raise the probability of tail
risk by all three definitions discussed above.
Historically, extreme foreign exchange rate fluctuations have been
associated with equally extreme economic and financial events. The reason for the extreme importance of
foreign exchange rates is simple.
Foreign exchange rates feed through both to the stability of the
financial system and the performance of the underlying economies.
Many financial advisors recommend rebalancing a
portfolio regularly. The end of the year
or the beginning of the new year is a convenient time for financial advisors to
include a reminder about rebalancing.
There is no magic associated with annual rebalancing, but the change in
the calendar does provide a convenient marker for financial advisors or
investors who need a reminder.
Rebalancing a portfolio is often presented as a way
for an investor to reduce risk that may have developed as a result of
differences in performance of different assets.
However, in fact,rebalancing does not necessarily reduce or increase the
risk in a portfolio. Whether it
increases or decreases the risk depends upon what assets are being sold and
what are being bought. (Technically it
depends upon the volatility of the assets being bought and being sold). The real reason for rebalancing is to keep
the risk-return profile stable at some level initially set to represent the
investor’s risk tolerance.
A previous posting entitled “Does AlgorithmicTrading Make Sense for Small Investors?” discussed the limitations on some of
the assumptions associated with the approach when applied across asset
classes. Instability in the correlation
matrix was one of the limitations mentioned.
So far, the phenomena discussed in “Markets in Motion” have not resulted
in tail risk in this sense, at least not for US investors. Consequently, for a US investor, rebalancing seems
to have achieved the desired results so far in 2015. For example, as stock prices declined, bond
prices increased. (It is worth noting, however, that when one takes a global
perspective, rebalancing has not worked for investors in every country).
However, when examined closely, it can be seen that
rebalancing appears to have achieved the desired objective, but that appearance
is due to returns. The point of
"Markets in Motion" was that the phenomena being discussed, oil
prices and exchange rates, have increased volatility of all assets. The portfolio’s overall risk has changed if
the change in the volatility of different asset classes is not uniform. It seems naive to assume that the volatility
of all asset classes is changed in the same way.
In order to achieve a rebalancing that maintains the
risk-return profile, one has to forecast not just how returns vary with
fluctuations in oil prices and exchange rates, but also how volatilities of
each individual asset class is changed.
In and of itself, the fluctuations in volatility may make any portfolio
of financial assets more risky. That is
true if the fluctuations in oil prices and exchange rates increase the
volatility of all asset classes. It is
also conceivable that it would reduce the risk.
To illustrate using just using US stocks and bonds,
in 2014 the returns on stocks and bonds can be represented as follows: the
S&P (NYSEARCA:SPY) delivered 13.5%, a broad-based bond index (NYSEARCA:AGG)
delivered 6%, long-term Treasuries (NYSEARCA:TLT) delivered 27.3%. Thus, a portfolio of stocks, bonds and
Treasuries would be rebalanced at the end of 2014 by selling Treasuries and
increasing stocks and non-Treasury bond holdings.
One way to view that rebalancing is to believe that
during 2014 the increase in the value of Treasuries reduced the risk in the
portfolio to the point where rebalancing into stocks and bonds was needed in
order to restore it to a given risk-return profile. In other words, the rebalancing is needed to
restore the risk that was eliminated in the portfolio by the increase in the
weight of the Treasury component. The
alternative is to view the volatility associated with a higher returns to
Treasuries as implying that they are more risky than they were going into 2014. In this view, Treasuries are now viewed as an
asset with greater risk than they had at the beginning of 2014. Selling the Treasury reduces the risk because
Treasuries have become more risky assets.
However, one should keep in mind that a significant portion of the increase in the price of Treasuries is a response to foreign exchange fluctuations. In short, foreign exchange rates have made Treasuries more risky by increasing their price. But again, that is just normal portfolio adjustment. Once one starts to think in terms of global investors, one has to realize that each investor has an investment option that is analogous to Treasuries for US investor. That option is their home country’s sovereign debt. Some of the investments moving into Treasuries last year, and especially so far this year, moved from foreign countries’ sovereign debt. However, those flows come from both equity and bond holdings in those foreign countries. The correlation between stocks and bonds has broken down for those foreigners if funds flow out of all asset classes.
One could argue that because an investor must anticipating the impact of oil and exchange rates on two variables (the level
of asset prices and their volatility) it has introduced additional
uncertainty. That is a real source of
increase in risk, but it is not potential of tail risk. The important change in the risk associated
with any portfolio becomes apparent when one adopts a definition of tail risk
that involves only financial assets. For
the US, it is reasonable to assume that the increase in the price of Treasuries
has increased their potential volatility.
It is easy to dismiss that as just true of any asset that gains
significantly in price.
However, one should keep in mind that a significant portion of the increase in the price of Treasuries is a response to foreign exchange fluctuations. In short, foreign exchange rates have made Treasuries more risky by increasing their price. But again, that is just normal portfolio adjustment. Once one starts to think in terms of global investors, one has to realize that each investor has an investment option that is analogous to Treasuries for US investor. That option is their home country’s sovereign debt. Some of the investments moving into Treasuries last year, and especially so far this year, moved from foreign countries’ sovereign debt. However, those flows come from both equity and bond holdings in those foreign countries. The correlation between stocks and bonds has broken down for those foreigners if funds flow out of all asset classes.
For the US investor, the potential for tail risk is
currently concentrated in the international portion of their portfolio. A previous posting entitled “Funds for AssetClass Diversification” discussed two mutual funds used to achieve international
diversification. The posting also
discussed the philosophy behind holding those two funds. They are treated similarly to any other
position. Thus, mutual funds are not the
only way international diversification is achieved. In addition to the funds there are individual
stocks in non-US companies. The
potential of tail risk impacts each fund and individual stock holding
differently. Since this posting has so
far discussed rebalancing in terms of asset classes, the balance of this
posting will focus on the funds. Individual
stocks will be the subject of future posting.
The two funds in question are Spartan International
Index Investor Class and the Lazard Emerging Market Equity Blend Portfolio. The reader should keep in mind that it is not
these particular funds that are at issue.
They were just chosen as representative of an asset class. That is the role they played in the
portfolio, and it is their role in this posting. So, the issue becomes whether just having a
representative of the asset class continues to make sense.
If the hypothesis that volatile foreign exchange rates
and oil prices have increased the tail risk associated with foreign assets is correct,
neither fund continues to provide the benefits that justifies including it in
the portfolio. In addition to the diversification benefits, the funds also embody a new higher probability of tail risk. An alternative strategy
is to focus on specific stocks in non-US companies as a way to avoid the tail
risk. It should be possible to pick
countries and companies that are less exposed to the potential of a collapse of
the financial system of the country.
Since both funds include equities denominated in a
variety of currencies, shifting to individual holdings could increase the
currency risk as well as the company specific risk. However, the tail risk seems to justify
accepting the need to bear the foreign currency risk. The currency risk was always there; picking individual
holdings just makes it apparent. The
decision regarding how many non-US stocks and how many currencies have to be represented
then becomes an issue of how confident the investor is in their ability to
trade off tail risk against more concentrated currency and stock specific risk.
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